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Abstract
Behavioral economics has shown that in many situations, people’s
behavior differs from what is predicted by simple traditional utilitymaximization economic models. It is therefore desirable to be able to
accurately describe people’s actual behavior. In some cases, the difference from the traditional models is caused by bounded rationality – our
limited ability to process information and to come up with a truly optimal
solutions. In such cases, predicting people’s behavior is difficult. In other
cases, however, people actually optimize – but the actual expression for
utility is more complicated than in the traditional models. In such case,
it is, in principle, possible to predict people’s behavior. In this paper, we
show that two phenomena – reciprocity and temptation – can be explained
by optimizing a complex utility expression. We hope that this explanation
will eventually lead to accurate prediction of these phenomena.

1

Formulation of the Problem

Behavioral economics: a brief reminder. Traditional economic models
assumed that people thoroughly analyze all their options and make optimal
decisions based on this analysis.
In many decision-making situations, this assumption works reasonably well
and leads to a reasonably accurate description of an overall economic process.
However, many research results performed in the last decades – some of them of
Nobel Prize quality – have shown that in many practical situations, the actual
people’s behavior differs from the assumed ideal one. The analysis of such
behavior and its economic consequences is known as behavioral economics.
Challenges for behavioral economics. Behavioral economics provides con-
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vincing and impressive examples of people’s non-optimal behavior. However, in
many cases, it does not provide us with quantitative models that would predict actual people’s behavior. Coming up with such models is an important
challenge for behavioral economics.
One way to come with such predictions is to better understand why people’s
behavior differs from the predictions of traditional economic models – so that,
hopefully, this understanding will lead us to the desired predictions.
Why people’s behavior differs from the traditional economic predictions: two main reasons. There are two main reasons why people’s behavior
differs from the traditional economic models.
The first reason is that when making decisions, people often have limited
ability (and limited time) to make a decision. As a result, they sometimes make
a sub-optimal decision. In such situations, it is, in general, not easy to come up
with the adequate model of people’s behavior – this requires a deep knowledge
of how exactly we process limited information in our brains.
However, there is another reason why people’s behavior is often different
from what the traditional economic models would prescribe. Namely, many
traditional economic models – models that assume that each person wants to
maximize his/her gain (usually formalized as utility) – provide an oversimplified
understanding of how people gauge the gains from different possible actions. In
such situations, in principle, we can come up with quantitative models of human
behavior – for this, we need to provide more adequate, more accurate models
of human utility.
Such situations are the “low-hanging fruits” of this research areas, topics in
which there is the biggest hope of reaching quantitative descriptions of human
behavior.
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we provide two examples of such
phenomena, examples that correspond to (seemingly unrelated) phenomena of
reciprocity and temptation. It turns out that while, from the economic viewpoint, these are two different behaviors, they can be explained by using similar
ideas and similar techniques.

2

How to Make Traditional Models More Adequate: Empathy and Discounting

Utility in the traditional economic models. In the traditional economic
models, it is usually assumed that a decision maker maximizes his/her gain
(numerically expressed as utility u), and this utility value describe the effect
of this decision on this person at this particular moment of time; see, e.g.,
[7, 15, 23, 24, 28].
Need to go beyond traditional models. In these models, person’s decisions
are not affected by gains (utilities) of others and/or by gains of the same person
at future moments of time. To some extent this is true, but one can easily find
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examples where gains of others (and/or future gains of the same person) do
affect our behavior.
Maybe a proverbial greedy capitalist would gladly earn an extra million
by making his workers work more and thus, get less utility, but in general,
hardly anyone would prefer, e.g., $101 to $100 if this increase is accompanied
by someone’s severe suffering. Some people spend all their money like there is no
tomorrow and retire in poverty, but most people do limit somewhat their current
expenses to save for retirement. It is all a matter of degree. Some people are not
empathetic enough, some do not save enough – but to some degree, practically
everyone is empathetic and practically everyone saves (at least something).
(0)

How to describe dependence on other’s utilities. Let ui be approximate
utilities that come only from this person’s consumption. How can we describe
the actual utilities ui that take into account other people’s feelings – i.e., in
precise terms, other people’s utilities?
(0)
A natural way is to add,to ui , terms proportional to other people’s utilities,
i.e., to consider expressions of the type
X
(0)
ui = ui +
αij · uj ,
(1)
j6=i

where each coefficient αij describes how the utility of the i-th person depends
on the utility of the j-th person; see, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 24, 29, 30, 35].
This phenomenon is known by a polite term empathy, since for positive values
αij , this formula describes how people feel better if others around them are
happier. However, from the purely mathematical viewpoint, it is also possible
to have negative values αij , when someone’s happiness makes the other person
unhappy. This is not just a mathematical example, such things like jealousy
and hatred are, unfortunately, quite real :-(
How to describe dependence on utility in different moments of time.
In the traditional economic models, we assume that a person’s utility at moment t is determined only by his/her consumption at this moment of time. In
reality, in addition to this approximate utility ut , the person also takes into
account future utilities ut+1 , ut+2 , . . . , and past utilities ut−1 , ut−2 , etc., with
appropriate coefficients:
X
X
u = ut +
qj · ut+j +
qj · ut+j .
(2)
j>0

j<0

This phenomenon is known as discounting, since a person usually considers
future experiences as less valuable than the present ones: e.g., people will pay
less that a dollar for a chance to get a dollar a year from now; see, e.g., [6, 8,
12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 27, 36].
What we will do now. Let us show that these two phenomena explain people’s
behavior corresponding to reciprocity and temptation.
3
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Reciprocity: What It Is and How It Can Be
Explained

What is reciprocity. Usually, people have reasonably fixed attitude to others:
they feel empathy towards members of their family, members of their tribe,
usually citizens of their country – and may be consistently negative towards
their country’s competitors. However, in addition to these consistent feelings,
they also have widely fluctuating attitudes towards people with whom they
work – or at least with whom they are teams up in a experiment set up by a
behavioral economics researcher.
It turns out that while it is difficult to predict how these attitudes will evolve
– even in what direction they will evolve, positive or negative – there is a general
phenomenon that people are nice to those who treat them nicely and negative
to those who treat them badly. In terms of the coefficients αij it means that:
• if αji is positive, then we expect αij to be positive too, and
• if αji is negative, then we expect αij to be negative too;
see, e.g., [26, 31].
This reciprocity phenomenon is intuitively clear – this is, after all, a natural
human behavior – but how can we explain it in economic terms?
Let us formulate the problem in precise terms. To explain the reciprocity
phenomenon, let us consider the simplest case of formula (1), when we have only
two people. In this case, the formula (1) for these two people takes the following
form:
(0)
u1 = u1 + α12 · u2 ;
(3)
(0)

u2 = u2 + α21 · u1 .

(4)

Since each person tries to maximize his/her utility, a natural question is as
follows:
• suppose that Person 1 knows the attitude α21 of Person 2 towards him/her;
• what value α12 describing his/her attitude should Person 1 select to maximize his/her utility u1 ?
Analysis of the problem. If we replace, in the right-hand side of the equality
(3), the value u2 with the right-hand side of the expression (4), we get
(0)

(0)

u1 = u1 + α12 · u2 + α12 · α21 · u1 .
If we move all the terms containing u1 into the left-hand side, we get
(0)

(0)

u1 · (1 − α12 · α21 ) = u1 + α12 · u2 ,
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hence

(0)

u1 =

(0)

u1 + α12 · u2
.
1 − α12 · α21

(5)

This expression can take infinite value – i.e., as large a value as possible – if we
take the value
1
α12 =
,
(6)
α21
for which the denominator is 0. We can make it positive – and as large as possible
– if we take α12 close to the inverse 1/α21 , so that the difference 1 − α12 · α21
will not be exactly 0, but be close to 0, with the same sign as the expression
(0)
(0)
u1 + α12 · u2 .
This explains reciprocity. Indeed, according to the formula (6):
• if α21 is positive, then the selected value α12 is also positive, and
• if α21 is negative, then the selected value α12 is also negative.

4

Temptation: What It Is and How It Can Be
Explained

What is temptation. A popular book [34] by a Nobelist Richard H. Thaler
starts the chapter on temptation (Chapter 2) with a simple example: a group
of friends are given a big bowl of nuts before dinner. As they eat more and
more nuts, they realize that if they continue, they will have no appetite for the
incoming tasty dinner, so they decided to put away the bowl.
All this sounds reasonable, until we start analyzing it from the economic
viewpoint. From this viewpoint, the more options we have, the better, so how
come the elimination of one of the options made everyone happier?
This is just one example; for other examples and for a general analysis of
this phenomenon, see, e.g., [5, 8, 10, 16, 20, 25, 32, 33, 34].
What if we take discounting into account. Let us try to resolve this puzzle
by taking discounting into account. Let us denote the overall amount of food
that a person can eat in the evening by a (e.g., by a grams), the utility for
eating one gram of nuts by n, the utility of eating one gram of dinner by d, the
discounting coefficient from dinner to now by q+ , and the amount of nuts that
we eat now by x. The variable x can take any value from the interval [0, a].
In terms of these notations, when we eat x grams of nuts and a − x grams
of actual dinner, then, taking into account discounting, the overall utility now
is equal to
n · x + q+ · d · (a − x).
(7)
According to the usual decision making idea, we want to select the amount x
for which this utility is the largest. But the expression (7) is linear in x, so
its largest value on the interval [0, a] is attained at one of the endpoints of this
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interval, i.e., either for x = 0 or for x = a. In the first case, we do not eat any
nuts at all, in the second case, we only eat nuts and do not eat any dinner. This
may be mathematically reasonable, but this is not how people behave! How can
we explain how people actually behave?
Taking into account that at different moments of time, people have
different preferences. In the previous text, we assumed that the only way
a person takes into account future events is by discounting. This would make
sense if the same person at different moment of time has the same preferences.
In reality, people’s preferences change. To some extent, the same person at
different moments of time is a kind of a different person. So, a proper way to
take that into account is to realize that when a person makes decision, he or
she needs to find a compromise between his/her today’s interests and his/her
interests at other moments of time.
This situation is similar to situation of joint decisions making, when several
people with somewhat different interests try to come up with a group decision
– the only difference is that different people can decide not to cooperate at all,
while here, “agents” (i.e., the same person at different moments of time) are
“joined at the hip” – decisions by one of them affect another one. Thus, to
properly describe decision making, we need to view the problem as a problem
of group decision making – group decision making by agents representing the
same person at different moments of time.
According to decision theory, a group decision of several cooperating agents
should be maximizing the product of their utilities. This is known as Nash’s
bargaining solution; see, e.g., [23, 21, 22]. So, in our case, a person making a
decision should be maximizing the product of the utilities at different moments
of time.
Let us show, on the above example, that this indeed helps us avoid the above
un-realistic prediction that we should have x = 0 or x = a.
How this idea help. Let us consider the simplest case of two moments of
time: the original moment of time when we are eating (or not eating) nuts,
and the future moment of time when we will be eating dinner. In the original
moment of time, the utility is described by the formula (7). Similarly, at the
next moment of time, the utility is described by a formula q− · n · x + d · (a − x),
for an appropriate discounting coefficient q− . Thus, the correct value x is the
one that maximizes the product
(n · x + q+ · d · (a − x)) · (q− · n · x + d · (a − x)).
This function is quadratic, and, in contrast to linear functions, the maximum
of a quadratic function on an interval is not necessarily attained at one of the
interval’s endpoints.
Let us illustrate it on a simplified example where computations are easy:
a = 1, n = 1, d = 2, and q+ = q− = 0.25. In this case, we maximize the
function
(x + 0.5 · (1 − x)) · (0.25 · x + 2 · (1 − x)) = (0.5 · x + 0.5) · (2 − 1.75 · x).
6

Differentiating this expression with respect to x and equating the derivative to
0 leads to
0.5 · (2 − 1.75 · x) + (0.5 · x + 0.5) · (−1.75) = 0,
i.e., to 0.125 = 1.75 · x and
x=

0.125
1/8
1
=
=
≈ 0.07.
1.75
7/4
14

The values a, n, etc., were kind of random, but the resulting proportion of nuts
snack in the food – about 7% – is quite reasonable.
Comment. So why is everyone happy that the temptation was taken away?
Because this allowed everyone not to violate their social contract – in this case,
a social contract (as described by Nash’s bargaining solution) between a person
now and the same person in the future.
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